

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
----- 115632

O R 180937 Z JUN 73

FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4481

INFO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY SAIGON

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 KUALA LUMPUR 2617

EXDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CA, ID, MY, VS, VN

SUBJECT: ICCS

REF: (A) STATE 117193

(B) KUALA LUMPUR 2345

(C) KUALA LUMPUR 2462

(D) JAKARTA 6537

SUMMARY: GOM HAS SOME RESERVATIONS ABOUT ASSUMING
ICCS ROLE AND IF APPROACHED TODAY' S ODDS ARE ONLY EVEN
THAT THEY WOULD ACCEPT POSITION. POLITICAL PROS AND CONS
ARE BALANCED, AND PERSONNEL PROBLEMS WOULD BE DIFFICULT.
THESE ODDS MIGHT BE A BIT HIGHER IF THEY HAD REASON TO
BELIEVE HANOI HAD NO OBJECTIONS, THAT PARTICIPATION
WAS OF LIMITED DURATION AND THAT ICCS MIGHT BE MORE
EFFECTIVE IN NEAR FUTURE THAN IN PAST. END SUMMARY.

1. POLITICAL DOUBTS IN GOM MIND CONCERN EFFECT REPLACING
PRO- WESTERN REP ON ICCS WOULD HAVE ON MALAYSIA' S NON-
ALIGNED IMAGE AND POSSIBILITY THAT COMPLEXION OF ICCS WOULD
SUGGEST ASIAN VERSUS COMMUNIST CONFRONTATION. MFA SEC GEN
ZAITON RECENTLY MADE LATTER POINT TO ME (SEE REF C) AND ADDED
THAT VIETNAM SETTLEMENT OF WIDER SIGNIFICANCE THAN TO ASIAN
AND COMMUNIST COUNTRIES ALONE, WHICH UNDERLINES NEED FOR
NON- ASIAN SUCCESSOR TO CANADA.

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WM IN SPITE OF THESE DOUBTS, HOWEVER, TENTATIVE INDICATIONS
REMAIN THAT GOM HAS NOT SHUT DOOR ON MATTER. WE HEAR THAT
MFA' S OBJECTIONS ARE OFFSET SOMEWHAT BY ADVISORS AROUND PM' S
OFFICE WHO ARE ATTRACTED BY PROSPECT OF ENHANCING GOM' S
INTERANTIONAL PRESTIGE. ZAITON (REF B) SAID IT WOULD DEPEND
ON HOW THEY WERE ASKED AND RAZAK RECENTLY (REF C) REPLIED
IN SIMILAR (#) BE INDICATED

THAT HANOI HAD ACQUIESCED OR AT LEAST HAD BEEN CONSULTED
AND HAD PRESENTED NO OBJECTIONS TO MALAYSIA' S
CANDIDACY, GOM' S CONCERN RE ITS NON- ALIGNED POSTURE WOULD
BE SOMEWHAT DISPELLED. INDICATIONS THAT MOST RECENT PARIS
NEGOTIATIONS SHOW PROMISE THAT ICCS' ROLE WILL BE MORE EFFECTIVE
THAN IN PAST WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL.

3. AS IS WELL- KNOWN, JAKARTA' S VIEWS WEIGH HEAVILY IN KUALA
LUMPUR THESE DAYS AND REF D SUGGESTS STRONG GOI PREFERENCE FOR
MALAYSIA AS CANADA' S REPLACEMENT. IF, IN CONCERT WITH US AND
GVN APPROACH, INDONESIANS COULD BE ENLISTED TO MAKE STRONG
POSITIVE REPRESENTATIONS TO GOM, PREFERABLY SUHARTO TO RAZAK,
THIS WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE POSITIVE IMPACT ON GOM DECISION.

4. FOR MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS, CONTENT OF APPROACH, IN
ADDITION TO ELEMENTS SUGGESTED IN PARA 2, SHOULD INCLUDE
FOLLOWING POINTS: (A) MALAYSIA PROBABLY ONLY OTHER ASIAN COUNTRY
ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES. (B) MALAYSIAN PARTICIPATION WITH
INDONESIA COULD STRENGTHEN ICCS BY PROVIDING GREATER SEA
PRESENCE TO DEAL WITH REGIONAL PROBLEM. (C) WITH BOTH
MALAYISAN AND INDONESIAN PARTICIPATION, THE IMAGE OF ASEAN
IS ENHANCED AS A CONSTRUCTIVE INFLUENCE IN THE REGION.

NOTE BY OC/ T: (#) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4482

INFO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY SAIGON

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 KUALA LUMPUR 2617

EXDIS

5. WHILE MALAYSIAN LEADERS PRIVATELY ARE KNOWN TO SYMPATHIZE WITH US AND GVN INTERESTS ON VIETNAM CONFLICT, SHOULD GOM ACCEPT ICCS POSITION, WE COULD NOT EXPECT THEM TO ASSUME SUPPORTIVE, AND LEADERSHIP ROLE - THE "BRAINS AND BACKBONE" - WHICH WE UNDERSTAND CANADIANS HAVE PLAYED ON COMMISSION. IN VIEW OF THEIR NON-ALIGNED SENSITIVITIES, AS WELL AS THEIR BILATERAL HISTORY AND RELATIONS, MALAYSIANS WOULD MORE LIKELY TEND TO SUPPORT AND FOLLOW LEAD OF INDONESIANS. ADDITIONALLY, THEY WOULD IN GENERAL, SEEK TO AVOID CONFRONTATIONS WITH COMMUNIST MEMBERS OF COMMISSION AS WELL AS AVOID TAKING POSITIONS WHICH WOULD CREATE FRICTIONS WITH DRV, A STATE WITH WHICH THEY HAVE JUST RECENTLY ESTABLISHED DIPLOMATIC TIES.

6. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS ASIDE, THE PERSONAL PROBLEM WOULD BE REAL, IF NOT CRUCIAL. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT CANADIAN DELEGATION CONSISTS OF APPROX: (A) 20 DIPLOMATIC OFFICERS (INCLUDING TWO OF AMBASSADORIAL RANK), (B) APPROX 200 MILITARY OFFICERS (FROM CAPTAIN UPWARDS, INCLUDING 15 COLONELS AND ONE GENERAL) AND (C) OTHER 70 MILITARY (LIEUTENANTS AND ENLISTED). IT WOULD PRESENT A STRAIN, ALTHOUGH PERHAPS NOT AN UNACCEPTABLE ONE, FOR THE GOM TO PROVIDE COMPARABLE NUMBERS AND RANKS, ESPECIALLY AS EVERYONE CONCERNED WOULD WISH THESE PERSONNEL TO BE HIGH QUALITY. IN ADDITION THEY WOULD HAVE SOME DIFFICULTY PROVIDING DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL AS THEIR MIDDLE AND UPPER GRADES ARE VERY THIN. IF THE PRESSURE AND ULTIMATE WILL TO PARTICIPATE WERE GREAT ENOUGH, HOWEVER,

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THEY PROBABLY COULD COME UP WITH THE DIPLOMATIC OFFICIALS AND DRAW OFF THE MILITARY PERSONNEL WITHOUT DECISIVELY JEOPARDIZING THEIR EFFORTS TO CONTAIN THEIR RELATIVELY LIMITED AND LOW-LEVEL INSURGENCIES.

7. PERHAPS A MEASURE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PERSONNEL PROBLEM WAS REFLECTED IN A RECENT COMMENT TO ME (REF C) BY PM RAZAK WHEN HE STATED THE GOM WOULD HAVE PROBLEMS RAISING REQUIRED HIGH QUALITY MILITARY PERSONNEL FOR ICCS EFFORT AS THEIR BEST OFFICERS ARE COMMITTED TO OWN INTERNAL NEEDS. THIS MAY BE PRINCIPAL INDICATION THAT SHOULD GOM DECIDE TO DECLINE ICCS PARTICIPATION EVEN FOR POLITICAL REASONS, THEY MIGHT USE THIS AS HANDY EXCUSE.

CHESLAW

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